One final point, one that plumbs the depths of Kant’s arbitrariness, merits our attention before moving on. As remarked earlier, Kant offers what he regards as alternative, equivalent formulations of the categorical imperative. Any act that passes the best of Universal Law also passes the test of End in Itself, and vice versa；and any act that fails the one also fails the other.
カントの「恣意性」(arbitrariness)について、レ－ガンは更に追求する。「定言命法の法式」(formulations of the categorical imperative）と同等のものとして、カントは「目的それ自体」(End in Itself)の法式を提示する。すなわち、「最高の普遍的法則」(the best of Universal Law)としての「定言命法」に合格するどんな行為も、「目的それ自体」の試験に合格する。その逆もまた同様である。
This can be shown to be false. Suppose I am considering whether to be a vegetarian, not out of considerations that relate to my health but because I think that the intensive rearing of farm animals is wrong and is wrong because of how the animals are treated. If I make use of the Formula of Universal Law, there is no reason why I cannot universalize the relevant subjective maxim: no one is to support the intensive rearing of farm animals by purchasing meat from these sources. But now suppose I consult the Formula of End in Itself. That formula instructs me always to treat humanity, either in my own person or in the person of any other, always as an end, never as a means merely.
このカントの考えは誤りである、とレーガンは主張する。その際、「ベジタリアンになる」(be a vegetarian)かどうかについてレーガンは仮定する。「普遍的法則の法式」を利用するならば、家畜の集中飼育は間違っているので「ベジタリアンになる」という「主観的格率」(subjective maxim)は「普遍化」(universalize)できる。一方、「目的それ自体の法式」を採用するならば、この法式は常に「人間性」(humanity)として自他の「人格」(person)を扱うことになる。
But how am I to assess the morality of my moral objections to factory farming by references to that formulation of the categorical imperative? Since the beings I am concerned about are not human beings, that formula provides me with no possible guidance. But if it provides me with no possible guidance, then the two formula- that of Universal Law and End in Itself- are not equivalent after all. For though my subjective maxim about not supporting the intensive rearing of animals passes the test of Universal Law, the morality of supporting the intensive rearing of animals cannot even be tested by, let alone pass, the Formula of the End in Itself. The moral arbitrariness characterizing Kant’s position thus makes its presence felt at the most fundamental level – at the level of his interpretation of the fundamental principle of morality.
「定言命法の法式」に基づく工場畜産への道徳的反対に関して、レーガンによれば、「普遍的法則の法式」と「目的それ自体の法式」は「等価」(equivalent)ではない。人間以外の動物の集中飼育を支持しないことについて、「主観的格率」は「普遍的法則のテスト」(the test of Universal Law)に合格はするが、人間以外の動物の集中飼育を支持する「道徳性」(the morality)はテストすらできない。この点にレーガンは、カントの特徴的立場である「道徳的恣意性」(The moral arbitrariness)を見る。
Only undefended prejudice could lead Kant to suppose that an expansive formulation of the fundamental principle of morality (that of Universal Law), one that allows us to test directly our maxims with regard to how animals may be treated, is equivalent to a restrictive formulation (that of End in Itself), one that has no direct bearing on questions relating to how animals may be treated. To limit the direct scope of the supreme principle of morality to how humans are to be treated arbitrarily favors these individuals as it arbitrarily excludes others.
That Kant’s assumptions are ill founded may perhaps be shown more clearly by considering the moral status of human moral patients, given his assumptions.By definition human moral patients are not moral agents and so, on Kant’s principles, are not rational beings.Because they are not rational beings, they can have no value in their own right and must, instead, be viewed as things, having value “merely as a means to an end”.It follows from this that we can do no direct moral wrong to any human moral patient. All that can be said about our moral dealings with such human is that our duties involving them are indirect duties to rational beings.
人間の道徳的受益者への道徳的地位を考えることによって、カントの仮定に根拠はないことは明らかである。カントの原則によれば、人間の道徳的受益者は理性的存在者ではない。道徳的受益者の権利自体に価値はない。代わりに、彼/彼女たちは「物件」(things)すなわち「単なる目的のための手段」(merely as a means to an end)として見なされなければならない。一方、道徳的受益者に直接的に道徳的不正を犯すことができない理由は、道徳的受益者への「義務」(duties)すべては、理性的存在者への「間接的な義務」(indirect duties)であるからである。
Thus, I do no moral wrong to a child if I torture her for hours on end. The moral grounds for objecting to what I do must be looked for elsewhere -namely, in the effect doing this will have on my character, causing me, so Kant’s view suppose, to become “hard” in my dealings with human moral agents.But suppose I torture only one human moral patient in my life.Though I am squeamish at first, suppose I steel myself against my usual sensitivities and use all my imagination to visit horror upon the child.And suppose that, having satisfied myself of what I had supposed might be true-namely, that I have no taste for torture-I release my captive and never again indulge in torturing any human being again. The habit of cruelty finds no permanent home in my breast.
この議論の中に出てくる「道徳的受益者」(moral patient)とは、例えば「子ども」が想定されている。カントの立場で考えると、何時間折檻しても、子どもに道徳的不正を犯していることにはならない。この行為を禁止すべき道徳的根拠は、われわれの性格に悪影響を与えるという点である。「道徳的受益者」は理性的存在者ではなく、単なる「物件」なので、2度と折檻しないと誓うならば、自分の胸の中に「残酷な習慣」(the habit of cruelty )は永久に残ることはない。
Are we to say that therefore I did nothing wrong to my one and only torture victim? However implausible this must seem, Kant’s position does imply that the correct answer is affirmative.
To defend the internal consistency of Kant’s position, given his assumptions, is one thing. To defend its adequacy is quite another. That position cannot be any more adequate than the assumption that animals are things and, relatively, that they have value “merely as means to an end “, that end being man.
「カントの立場の内部の一貫性を擁護すること」(To defend the internal consistency of Kant’s position)と「その妥当性を擁護すること」(To defend its adequacy)は、別の問題である。カントの立場では、人間以外の動物は単なる「物件」(things)である。そして彼/彼女たちは、「目的である人間への単なる手段として」相対的な価値以上の存在ではあり得ない。
The assumption that animals are things is false at best. For reasons given in chapter 3, it is reasonable to view animals as having a welfare that is not logically tied to their use by humans to promote human ends. Moreover, while it is admittedly true that animals lack the kind of autonomy required for moral agency, it is false that they lack autonomy in any sense. For animals not only have preference, they can also act, on their own, to satisfy these preferences.
To view them, as Kant does, as -like art supplies- things, and thus as having, as art supplies have, value only relative to human desires and purposes, is radically to distort what animals are. Even were we to concede, contrary to Broadie and Pybus, that Kant’s position is consistent, it does not follow that we should view it as adequate.
人間以外の動物を「人間の欲望や目的への単に相対的な価値」(value only relative to human desires and purposes)しか持たないと見なすことは、彼/彼女たちの存在を根本的に歪めることに繋がる。人間以外の動物を「人間の欲望や目的への単に相対的な価値」しか持たないとカントが一貫して認めたとしても、われわれはそれを認めるべきではない。【続く】
An example might make this clearer. An angry child who breaks his art supplies does not destroy something that exists as an end in itself; he destroys something that has value as a means.Now, the supplies, which have value merely as a means, have been treated in a way that is “unfitting to the nature” as things to be used for painting. But no moral wrong is thereby done to them; the child violates no direct duty owed to the supplies.
「自らの作品を壊し怒っている子ども」(An angry child who breaks his art)を、レーガンは例に挙げる。「自らの作品を壊し怒っている子ども」は、単に「手段として価値あるものを破壊」しているに過ぎない。「手段として価値あるもの」とは、「絵画」(painting)として使用されるものという意味である。「絵画」自体は、カントの言う「目的それ自体」(an end in itself)として存在しているわけではないので、その子どもに道徳的過失は生じない。
It does not follow, however, that we either would or must view his conduct as morally indifferent, or that we cannot follow Kant’s lead in attempting to explain why his behavior should be nipped in the bud. After all, one ought not to let one’s emotions get the best of one, not only because this will lead one to do some foolish things in a fit of rage (e.g., destroy art supplies one will later regret not having) but also because a repetition of such behavior could in time lead one to lash out in morally offensive ways towards those individuals towards whom one does have direct duties.Needless to destroy something that has value merely as a means arguably is to treat that thing in a way that is “unfitting to its nature”; but the moral grounds for objections to such destructions could be viewed as distinctively Kantian in flavor. Despite objections to the contrary, therefore, Kant can have a consistent position regarding the maltreatment of things having value merely as a means.
「自らの作品を壊し怒っている子ども」の「自らの作品を壊す」という「行為の芽を摘む」(be nipped in the bud）べき理由を説明するとき、カントの主張に従うことはできない。そのような行動を繰り返すと、道徳的に不快な方法で直接的に義務を負う個人をその子どもが打ちのめす可能性が生じるからである。手段として価値あるものを壊すことはいうまでもなく、「その本性に合わない」扱いをすることである。このように、カントは単なる手段として価値ある物件の不当な扱いに一貫した立場をとる。
This much granted, it is a small step, given his view of animals, to see that his position regarding their maltreatment also is consistent with general principles of his ethical theory. This is because animals are, in Kant’s view as Broadie and Pybus note, things and have “only relative value.” As things, then, we maltreat animals when we treat them in ways that reduce their value as means for those individuals for whom, in Kant’s view, they exist in the first place-human beings.
カントの動物観を考えると、動物虐待に関する立場もその倫理的な一般原則と一致する。ブローディーやパイバスによると、動物は物件であり「単に相対的な価値」(only relative value)でしかない。一方、カントの見解では、「人間のための手段として」(as means for those individuals）人間以外の動物を彼/彼女の価値を減少させるように扱うとき、われわれは彼/彼女たちを不当に扱うことになる。
To treat animals in ways that diminish their utility for us is indeed to treat them in ways “unfitting to their nature”, given Kant’s view, since their nature is to exist as means to our purpose. But the grounds Kant has, and those he can consistently have, for objecting to the maltreatment of animals, are not that acting in this way is contrary to any direct duty we have to them; rather, as in the analogous case regarding the gratuitous destruction of the art supplies, the grounds he has, and can consistently have, lie in the (supposed) effects this will have on our character and thus, in this view, on how in time the habit of treating animals cruelly will lead us to fail to fulfill our direct duties to those to whom we have such duties-namely, ourselves and other human beings.
カントの見解では、あくまで人間以外の動物は「人間の目的のための手段として」(as means to our purpose)存在するに過ぎない。われわれにとって有用性を低下させるように人間以外の動物を扱うことは、彼/彼女たちを「本性にふさわしくない」扱いをすることである。作品の不当な破壊に関する場合と同様、カントが一貫して持つ根拠は、人間以外の動物を不当に扱う行為がわれわれの人格に悪影響を与えることである。カントの見解では、動物を不当に扱う習慣が、われわれ自身や他の人間への直接的な義務を果たせなくなることに繋がる。【続く】
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